Introduction
T HE fact that economic theory places few restrictions on the form of the hedonic price function has led most researchers to use a goodness-of-fit criterion in choosing an appropriate form for the hedonic function. If, however, one's goal is to value product attributes, the form of the hedonic price function that should be used is the one that most accurately estimates marginal attribute prices. The latter measure consumers' marginal willingness to pay for attributes and thus may be used directly to value small changes in attribute levels. Marginal prices also constitute the dependent variables in the estimation of marginal bid functions; hence errors in their measurement may bias the valuation of non-marginal attribute changes as well. Thls paper examines how errors in measuring marginal prices vary with the form of the hedonic price function.
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Since computation of such errors requires the true marginal prices be known, errors in measul ing marginal prices must be computed in a simula tion context. o u r results are based on simulation of housing market equilibria in which consumer bid for a fixed housing stock. Equilibrium housin, prices, together with housing attributes, provid the data used to estimate hedonic price functions Since each consumer's equilibrium marginal bic for each attribute is known. the true margina price paid for each attribute is also known an( can be compared with the gradient of the hedonil price function.
Errors in estimating marginal prices are firs examined assuming that the researcher observe! all product attributes without error, and then as suming that some attributes are unobserved or arf measured by proxies. Whether or not all attributes are observed by the researcher significantly affect: the performance of various forms of the hedonic price function. When all attributes are observed. linear and quadratic functions of Box-Cox transformed variables provide the most accurate estimates of marginal attribute prices: the goodness-of-fit criterion suggested by Rosen (1974) . Goodman (1978) and Halvorsen and Pollakowski (1981) coincides with accurate measurement of marginal prices.
When certain variables are not observed, or when a variable is replaced by a proxy, a simple linear hedonic price function consistently outperforms the quadratic Box-Cox function, which provides badly biased estimates of "hard to measure" attributes. The misgivings of Cassel and Mendelsohn (1985) regarding the ability of the quadratic Box-Cox function to measure marginal attribute prices thus seem to be justified, at least when the hedonic price function is misspecified. A linear Box-Cox function, however, performs well in the presence of specification error. Since it also provides accurate marginal price estimates under perfect information, our simulations suggest that it is the functional form of choice.
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Simulation of Housing Market Equilibria
For our results to be robust, alternative housing
Our housing market consists of N houses, each described by an attribute vector Z, and N households. each endowed with a utility function, U,, income, y,, and a vector of personal characteristics, C,. Households bid against each other for the housing stock, with houses sold to the highest bidder (Wheaton, 1974) .
To define a housing market equilibrium let B,,(u,) denote household h's bid for house J when its utility level is u,. B,,(u,) is defined implicitly by
Let X,, = 1 if household h occupies house J and XhJ = 0 otherwise. An equilibrium in the housing market is a set of utilities u* = (u:, u;, . . . , u;), prices P * = (PI*, P,*, ..., P;), and an allocation
/ = 1 Equation (2) states that the equilibrium rent on house j equals the maximum willingness to pay (at utility u,*) of the household occupying j. It implies, furthermore, that no household is willing to pay more for house j than the household buying the house (houses are sold to the hghest bidder); moreover, the household could not receive hlgher utility by purchasing any other house. Conditions (3) and (4) specify that each house must be occupied and that each household must buy a house.' Equilibrium prices may be computed by iteratively solving an assignment problem (Koopmans and Beckmann, 1957; Wheaton, 1974) until the shadow prices attached to buyers (the side-payments necessary to maintain Current utility levels) are zero. The housing shadow prices, P ! , then constitute equilibrium rents.
' This definition of equilibrium corresponds to a '.closed city" in which the number of buyers and sellers is fixed, and utility levels adjust to equate the supply and demand for houses.
market equilibria must be computed. The true hedonic price function, i.e., the set of pairs { P,, Z,), can be altered by varying either (i) the form of 4; (ii) the distribution of parameters of U,; (iii) the attributes included in Z; (iv) the distribution of those attributes; (v) the distribution of buyer characteristics. A set of assumptions about (i)- (v) 
A. The Housing Stock
To make our simulations realistic, houses are drawn from homes sold in Baltimore City or Baltimore County in 1977-78. Baltimore City and County are treated as distinct housing markets, the former representing an older. urban, heterogeneous housing stock and the latter a more homogeneous, suburban area. The attributes of houses come from Multiple Listing data, and the attributes of neighborhoods from the 1980 Census of Housing and Population.
The attributes selected are those that commonly appear in empirical studies of housing demand (see table I ).' In selecting neighborhood attributes we have purposely chosen two that are highly correlated, PERCENT PROFESSIONAL and PERCENT HIGH SCHOOL, to see how various forms of the hedonic price function handle ~ollinearity.We have also chosen housing attributes that are discrete (NO. ROOMS, BATH-ROOMS, DETACHED, AIR-CONDITIONED, FIREPLACE, GARAGE) to compare the accumore complete description of our simulations is contained in an avoendis. available from the authors uDon re-'.
quest. The appendix includes detailed descriptions of the housing stock, of housing buyers and of the procedures used to select utilitv function varameters.
'The variables used l n our simulations, with the exception of Palmquist (1984) .
P E R C E S T O F HOCSEHO1,DS W I T H C H I I . D R E S , are a subset of the variables used by
The simple correlation coefficient between these variables is 0.76 in the City and 0.87 in the County.
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racy of their marginal prices with those of continRandomness in preferences captures the notion uous attributes.
that observationally equivalent persons may have different tastes. The diagonal covariance matrix B. Consumer Preferences implies that persons with a strong preference for interior space need not have a strong preference In all simulations utility is a function of housing for outdoor space. Whereas a, varies among attributes and all other goods, x, and has the households, the { b , , ) , which allow for complegeneral form mentarity between attributes, are the same for all u, = g(x) + Ca,, (C,?g(z,? buyer^.^ The choice of utility function parameters is described in an appendix available from the + 0 . 5 z i h . , g ( z . ) g ( z , ? .
( 5 ) authors. Table 1 indicates which buyer character-1 1 istics and which housing attributes enter the Two specific forms are used: the translog, in which marginal bid function for each attribute.
g(x) = ln(x), and the Diewert, in wh~chg(x) One implication of randomness in {a,,) is that = fi.In both cases parameters a,, depend on a simulation results hinge on the realization of {a,,,).
vector of measured buyer characteristics, C,, which For each scenario, 20 Monte Carlo simulations includes race, family size. whether the household were run, each corresponding to a different draw has children, and the education and occupation of from the distribution of a,. In all runs the the household head. Preferences also reflect un-joint distribution of y, and C, comes from the measured, individual-specific taste factors, a , = (a,,, . . . , a,,), which are assumed to be identically (6) and this property would be destroyed. 'If A, the parameter used to transform independent variables, is constrained to be nonzero. the two Box-Cox functions can be estimated using Kenneth White's SHAZAM program. The restriction that h # 0 should not greatly affect results since the Box-Cox transformation is a continuous function of A.
A. Errors in Measuring Marginal Prices When All Attributes Are Observed
When all attributes are observed, the linear and quadratic Box-Cox functions perform best based on the normalized mean and standard deviation of error criteria. We substantiate t h s with detailed results for the Baltimore City, Diewert Utility, Attribute List # 1 scenario (see table 2 The other attribute whose marginal price is estimated with errors in excess of 100% is PERCENT HIGH SCHOOL, which is highly correlated with PERCENT PROFESSIONAL ( r = 0.76). Collinearity presents problems for the linear, semi-log and double-log functions. The fact that marginal bids depend on several coefficients in the Box-Cox and quadratic cases may explain why these functions handle collinearity problems better: although individual coefficients may be unreliable due to collinearity, a linear combination of these coefficients need not be.
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Since economists are often interested in estimating the marginal prices of attributes that may be measured with large error, we have ranked the six hedonic functions according to the maximum value of I/3,I that each produces. By this criterion the linear Box-Cox function performs the best and the quadratic and double-log functions the worst. Table 3 
B. Bias in Measuring Marginal Price When Some Attributes Are Not Observed
Results, however, change when attributes are omitted from the hedonic price function, or are replaced by proxies. Table 2 summarizes the results of 10 Monte Carlo runs of the Baltimore City, Diewert Utility, Attribute List #1 scenario, in which SQ. FT. has been replaced by NUMBER OF ROOMS. In contrast to the perfect information case it is now the quadratic and Box-Cox quadratic functions that produce the largest normalized bias, and thls is sizeable: the quadratic functions underestimate the marginal bid for PERCENT CHILDREN by approximately 600%! The variance of the errors produced by the misspecified quadratic functions is also larger than in the perfect information case. The value of S,, averaged over all attributes, is 4.1342 for the quadratic function and 4.7260 for the quadratic Box-Cox function. compared with 0.9149 and 0.6241 in the perfect information case.
The linear Box-Cox function avoids the extremely large mean errors that characterize the two quadratic functions, and also produces the smallest average value of S, of all six functions, 0.4728. The linear and semi-log functions, too. The firht row c o n t a n s S,l. :ivcraged o \ c r all attnbutea r . the \econd row2 the rnxxunum IS,] over all 2 produce errors with a narrow spread: the variance the omission scenarios. These functions are espeof the errors in the linear case is equal to the cially likely to produce the hghest maximum norvariance in the true marginal prices (bids); in the malized bias, with predicted marginal prices somesemi-log case the variance of e,,, is fairly insensi-times off, on average, by an order of magnitude. tive to misspecification of the hedonic price func-The quadratic functions also produce the largest tion. average bias in a majority of the cases examined. In general, when variables are omitted or re-The quadratic forms may perform poorly when placed by proxies it is the simpler forms-the variables are omitted because each marginal price linear, semi-log, double-log-and the Box-Cox depends on more coefficients than in the linear linear that do best. Table 4 contains summary bias cases. Omitting variables thus biases more coeffimeasures (averaged across all trials) for each of 10 cients, and there is no reason to expect these omitted variable scenarios. Regardless of the crite-biases to cancel. rion used. the quadratic and Box-Cox quadratic There is some analytical evidence to support functions perform the worst or second-worst of all this result. Assume that the true hedonic price forms of the hedonic function in the majority of function is quadratic and that attributes are or-THE CHOICE OF FORM FOR HEDONIC PRICE FUNCTIONS thogonal. It can be shown that, for certain ranges of attribute values, a linear hedonic price function with one variable omitted produces unbiased estimates of mean marginal bids. A quadratic function that omits a variable (including its square and cross products) does not yield unbiased estimates of mean marginal bids.
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Of the six forms of the hedonic function considered, the linear and the Box-Cox linear perform the best in the presence of misspecification, with the Box-Cox linear function arguably the best of the six. Although it does not do quite as well as the linear function in producing the smallest maximum bias, it wins more often than the linear function according to the average bias criterion. Based on the results of our limited simulations, the linear Box-Cox function appears to be the functional form of choice when estimating hedonic price functions.
